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ABSTRACT 
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January 1996 
Several recent studies have examined the tendency of regions within a nation to exhibit 
long-tenn convergence in per capita income levels. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) 
have found a tendency towards convergence among the U.S. states, among Japanese prefectures, 
and among regions within Western Europe. In this paper we examine the tendency towards 
convergence among the provinces of China during the period 1952-1993. We find that real 
income convergence of provinces in China has been a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging 
strongly only since the refonn period began in 1978. During the initial phase of central planning, 
1952-1965, there is some evidence for convergence, but it is weak and sensitive to the time 
period being analyzed. During the cultural revolution, 1965-1978, there is strong evidence of 
divergence rather than convergence. We find strong evidence for convergence during the reform 
period is associated with rural reforms, and is especially strong within the coastal regions where 
there has been liberalization of international trade and investment flows. However, since 1990 
regional incomes have begun to diverge. Such a divergence is entirely explained by the variance 
between the coastal and interior provinces, rather than increase in variance within each other. 
Therefore, it seems that China is now on a dual track, with a prosperous and fast growing coastal 
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I. Introduction 
Several recent studies have examined the tendency of regions within a nation to exhibit 
long-term convergence in per capita income levels. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) 
have found a tendency towards convergence among the U.S. states during the period 1840-1980; 
among Japanese prefectures; and among regions within Western Europe. In this paper we 
examine the tendency towards convergence among the provinces of China. 
The Chinese case is interesting for several reasons. First, China has been subject to 
several distinctive policy regimes since the establishment of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949. The period 1952-1965 was a period of Soviet-style industrialization under 
centralized planning, punctuated by the disastrous policy experiment of the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1960), by serious nature disasters (1959-1961), and by the break with the Soviet Union 
and the withdrawal of Soviet aid. The period 1966-77 was the period of the Cultural Revolution, 
in which the centralized bureaucracy was virtually destroyed by internal political upheaval, and 
in which independent regions were forced into autarkic policies as the result of the breakdown of 
interregional exchange. The period 1978 till now has been characterized by increasing resort to 
market relations, though still in the context of dominant state ownership of heavy industry and 
Communist Party control of economic policy. We can examine how the tendency towards 
convergence was affected by these alternative policy episodes. 
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A second reason for interest is that China displays vast geographical disparities in the 
sectoral distribution of economic activity, living standards, resource base, and other 
determinants of income levels and income growth. These disparities put the issue of 
convergence into very sharp relief, since the gap in per capita income between the richest and 
poorest regions in the 1950s was as great as 11 to 1.1 
A third reason for interest is that China provides some important hints about the future 
tendencies that may face the second-most populous country in the world, India, as economic 
liberalization proceeds in that country. Indian policy-makers are worried that the trade 
liberalization initiated in 1991 might lead to widening inequalities among India's diverse regions. 
China's experience with trade liberalization after 1978, with rapid growth in the coastal 
provinces, should give some indication of the patterns that will be seen in India in future years. 
Finally, the issue of regional income disparity has become an important question of 
policy in China. In September 1995, the Chinese Communist Party, in the Fifth Section of the 
14th Plenary of CCPC, endorsed the view that regional inequalities widened since the reforms. 
As the party document says "since the adoption of reforms and open door policies, we have 
encouraged some regions to develop faster and get richer, advocated that the richer should act as 
a model for and help the poor. Each region has had big economic development and the people's 
standard of living has had great improvement. But for many reasons, regional economic 
inequalities have widened somewhat."2 In this paper we examine whether the evidence supports 
1 In 1952, the poorest province was Guizhou, with a per capita GDP in 1952 yuan equal to 
57.38. The richest province was Shanghai, with a per capita GDP in 1952 yuan equal to 640.20. 
2 People's Daily Overseas Edition, Oct. 5, 1995, p 4. 
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these claims. 
The next section, section 2, reviews the findings from previous research on regional and 
global convergence and asks whether similar results should apply in a planned economy such as 
China. Section 3 then presents the basic findings on Chinese economic convergence. We find 
that the tendency towards convergence has varied over time, according to the policy regime, with 
the strongest tendency towards convergence during the period of market reforms. Section 4 then 
offers more detailed statistical analysis of each of the three main periods, in an attempt to 
understand the economic forces behind the basic convergence results. Section 5 asks whether 
China is now on a path towards regional convergence or divergence. The last section summarizes 
the major conclusions of the paper. 
2. Convergence Across Regions and Countries 
Since there is no single accepted model of economic growth, there is no single theory of 
economic convergence. In the closed-economy Solow-Swan growth model, economies differ in 
per capita income as a result of differences in the capital-labor (K/L) ratio. For a given savings 
rate, a lower initial K/L is associated with a faster proportionate increase in K/L on the path to 
equilibrium (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995, Chapter 1). Hence, there is a tendency for poor 
countries to grow more rapidly than rich countries. If there is factor mobility between 
economies, labor will tend to migrate from the capital poor to the capital rich economy, while 
capital will tend to migrate in the other direction. Both types of migration will tend to equalize 
K/L between the economies, and thereby to equalize per capita income levels. Thus, factor 
mobility across regions will tend to speed the rate of convergence. Factor mobility may include 
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flows of technology -- through licensing, foreign direct investment, joint ventures -- as well as 
flows of labor and capital. 
Romer (1986) stressed that convergence need not occur if technology exhibits increasing 
returns to scale, rather than constant returns to scale as in the Solow-Swan model. In the case of 
increasing returns technology, national economies or regions that start with a high level ofKIL 
tend to maintain their lead in income levels over economies that start with lower levels of KIL. 
In Romer's models, K refers not only to physical capital but to human capital and the endogenous 
accumulation of technology. 
In even more general models, countries may differ in many dimensions other than 
resource endowments such as physical capital, human capital, labor, natural resources, and 
endogenous technology. Economies will differ in the stability and legal protection of property 
rights; the extent of government intervention in markets; and in other "endowments" not 
generally counted in the national accounts, such as geographical advantages or disadvantages. 
These differences may result in persistent differences in income levels across regions or national 
economies. Convergence among regions will be incomplete, even when the technology does not 
exhibit increasing returns to scale. Tendencies towards convergence may still exist -- countries 
with low KIL may grow faster than countries with high KIL, all other things constant -- but 
tendencies towards convergence would be evident only after controlling for the other 
determinants of long-term income levels. 
There has been lively empirical research in the past decade examining whether nations or 
sub-national economies tend to converge in real living standards over long time periods. One of 
the most provocative early works, by Paul Romer (1986), stressed that there was no tendency 
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towards convergence among all countries in the world in the post-war era. Romer suggested 
cautiously that the lack of convergence was evidence that aggregate production is subject to 
important increasing returns to scale. 
Later studies have suggested that factors other than the returns to scale in aggregate 
production can better explain the presence or absence of convergence. Several studies of regions 
within nations have found strong evidence for convergence. We noted in the introduction that 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin found evidence for convergence within the states of the United States 
over the period 1880-1990; within Japanese prefectures over the period 1930-1990; and within 
sub-national regions in Western Europe over the period 1950-1990. In all three cases they find 
strong evidence for what they term "unconditional convergence," defined as a tendency for the 
dispersion of income across regions to narrow over time. 
When we turn to the world economy, there is evidence of convergence within subsets of 
economies, even though there has not been convergence in the world economy as a whole. 
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) have found evidence for convergence among the OECD economies, 
and Ben-David (1993) has found evidence for convergence among the countries of the European 
Community. More recently, Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that convergence is found in the 
subset of countries linked together by open trade policies. When Sachs and Warner divide the 
world into open and closed economies, they fmd that the open group displays convergence, while 
the closed group does not. 
One unifying theme behind these empirical results, as well as the basic theory, is that 
convergence is most powerful when the economies in question are linked by open trade and 
factor mobility. The evidence suggests that inter-regional flows oflabor, capital, and technology 
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are the most important forces in the observed convergence of regions within a country, or 
between national economies linked through world markets. The conditions for a high degree of 
trade integration and factor mobility obviously apply within the regions of a single market 
economy, such as the states of the United States and the prefectures of Japan. They also apply, 
though somewhat less strongly, within the OECD, the European Union, and the subset of open-
trading countries in the world system. 
Many of the channels for convergence will tend to be cut off in socialist economies. The 
internal migration of labor is controlled by the government, usually for purposes of internal 
security as well as to meet bureaucratic targets for industrialization in particular regions. 
Similarly, investment spending across regions is allocated on the basis of political and 
bureaucratic considerations, not market returns. Moreover, technologies do not readily diffuse 
throughout the socialist economy. This was especially true in the Soviet Union, where research 
and development was concentrated in the military-industrial sector, with little diffusion to 
civilian industry. 
Tendencies towards convergence in centrally planned economies would therefore tend to 
be somewhat accidental in character. Central planners might or might not allocate capital to the 
poorer regions, perhaps as a result of bureaucratic targets for income equalization across the 
country. However, given the strong lobbying pressures of state enterprises in the socialist 
system, it is more likely that bureaucratic allocations of physical capital will tend to flow to 
existing concentrations of state enterprises, rather than to new geographical areas. 
Since labor migration across regions is normally such an important part of convergence 
within a market economy, it is worth describing the limitations on labor mobility within China. 
S 
Since the 1950s, labor migration has been controlled by the central government, mainly to 
prevent peasants from migrating to urban areas. The core of the controls lies in the 1958 
Regulation on the Registration of Households, which requires every household to register its 
place of residence, and to gain permission for any change in residence. Official permissions for 
changes in residence are strictly limited. During the period until the early 1980s, migration 
without permission (e.g. as an unregistered migrant working in an informal or non-state capacity) 
was extremely difficult. Food was strictly rationed, with food rations allocated on the basis of 
one's official residence. To move without permission would therefore mean to forego one's food 
rations, a near impossibility in the 1950s-1970s. In addition, children of illegal migrants would 
be denied access to schools, and other services provided in urban areas would similarly be 
unavailable to unregistered migrants. 
With the adoption of market reforms starting in 1978, it has become possible to obtain 
food and lodging on a market basis, so that unregistered migration has become somewhat easier 
in recent years. Nonetheless, the constraints against unregistered migration from the countryside 
to the urban areas are still powerful, since illegal migrants generally lack access to schooling for 
children, state-run health care and other urban services. Nonetheless, informal migration has 
increased enormously in the 1980s and 1990s, to an estimated 100-150 million persons in the 
mid-1990s. Many of the migrants are single, without families. Others are migrants who leave 
their families in rural areas for temporary work in the urban areas and then return to the 
countryside, perhaps on a seasonal basis. 
To our knowledge, the only other study on Chinese regional growth is a recent report by 
the World Bank (1995). The data in this paper differ in three important ways from their study. 
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First, this paper covers a longer time span (1952-1993 rather than 1978-1992). Second, we use 
region-specific price deflators, whereas the World Bank uses a common deflator for all 
provinces. Finally, the World Bank study does not calculate standard deviations or estimate 
regressions to examine convergence. 
3. Evidence on Convergence among Chinese Provinces 
When we turn to China, therefore, we should expect that tendencies towards convergence 
should depend on the balance between market and non-market forces. In particular, we would 
expect to see more forces working towards convergence after the onset of market reforms in 
1978, and especially in the most market-oriented parts of the country. We therefore begin our 
study of Chinese convergence by dividing recent Chinese economic history into three sub-
periods: the advent of state-led planning and the push for industrialization, 1952-1965; the 
Cultural Revolution, 1965-1978; and the period of market reforms, 1978-the present. This 
temporal division is justified on a priori grounds, since these periods reflect dramatic differences 
in basic economic policy. 
The People's Republic of China is currently divided into 30 provinces. Our sample has 
28 provinces for the reform period (1978-1993). The two remaining provinces (Tibet and 
Hainan) do not have data until in the late 1980's. In earlier periods, the sample size is smaller 
because of data availability, but we have data on a core group of 15 provinces for the entire 
1952-1993 period. A map of these provinces is shown in Figure 1, together with the province 
names and codes in Table 1. In Table 2 we show some basic economic data for these provinces 
in the middle of our sample, 1978. Per capita income is measured as per capita GDP in units of 
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1952 yuan, using provincial retail price deflators for each province. Further details about the 
data are reported in the appendix. 
We start with two ways of examining the presence or absence of unconditional 
convergence. The first measure is so-called a-convergence. We measure the standard deviation 
across regions of the logarithm of real GDP per capita, LGDPPC. We say that there is a-
convergence if this standard deviation tends to decline over time. The second measure is so-
called p-convergence. Here, we regress the proportionate growth in per-capita GDP on the initial 
level of per-capita GDP. We say that there is p-convergence if the coefficient on initial income, 
denoted p, is negative and statistically significant. 
The evidence on a-convergence is shown in Figure 2, where we plot the standard 
deviation ofLGDPPC. We report the results for both a I5-province sample, which we have for 
selected years over the entire period, and for a 27-province sample which is available more 
frequently for the 1978-1993 period. The vertical lines demarcate the three main periods of 
policy, 1952-65, 1966-77, and 1978-93. We see from the figure that regional income dispersion 
fell slightly between 1952 and 1965, with a sharp rise associated with the Great Leap forward 
and natural disasters in the early 1960's, with a sharp reversal after 1962. The regional income 
dispersion then rose steadily and significantly during the Cultural Revolution. The 1978 reforms 
started a steady 12-year decline in regional income dispersion that seems to have ended around 
1990. The last three years in the figure provide some evidence that regional income dispersion 
has widened since 1990. 
These same basic timing is evident in the measures of p-convergence, shown in the 
regressions in Table 3. The table reports a small, and statistically insignificant negative 
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association between growth and initial GDP per-capita during the 1952-1965 period. During the 
Cultural Revolution, by contrast, we see a positive and statistically significant value of ~, 
evidence for divergence. During the reform period, there is statistically significant evidence of 
convergence. 
The evidence at this broad level therefore suggests that regional income convergence is a 
relatively recent phenomena in China, emerging in a decisive way only since the reforms began 
in 1978, and perhaps ending (at least temporarily) in the early 1990s. In the following section we 
examine the three periods in more detail to understand what is driving these results. 
4. Episodes in Chinese Policy 
(a) Central planning, 1952-1965 
The first phase includes the first 5-year plan (1953-57), based on Soviet-style central 
planning; the Great Leap Forward, 1958-61; and a return to modified central planning during 
1962-65. We find little evidence for convergent forces during this period. Instead, the 
dispersion of provincial GDP is better explained in terms of three sharp policy shifts as well as 
the natural disasters that hit the interior during the period 1959-1961. 
The major thrust of the first 5-year plan was a push for Soviet-style industrialization and 
a bias against agricultural regions. Industrial investments went mainly to the provinces that 
already had some industry at the start of socialist period, specifically Shanghai, Liaoning, and 
Tianjin. Since agricultural provinces as of 1952 had lower than average incomes at the start of 
the period, and received a disproportionately small share of centrally allocated resources for 
industrialization, the push for industrialization should by itself have promoted divergence rather 
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than convergence in provincial incomes. It is therefore unclear why the overall evidence 
suggests, if anything, a very slight convergence in provincial incomes. 
To look at this further, we report convergence regressions in Table 4 that attempt to 
control for the anti-agricultural bias of the central planning system. For each province, we 
calculate the share of agriculture in GDP within the province in the initial year 1952, and include 
that agricultural share as a regressor. We presume that provinces with a high share of agriculture 
in 1952 will grow less rapidly during 1952-65, since these provinces will be discriminated 
against in the allocation of industrial investments. This indeed appears to be the case: the initial 
agricultural share of GDP share enters with a negative coefficient that is close to statistical 
significance. Controlling for the agricultural share, the initial per capita income now enters with 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Taken at face value, the regression suggests 
that there were two offsetting forces at work during 1952-65: a bias against the agricultural 
regions, which tended to promote divergence (since the agricultural regions were below average 
in per capita income), together with additional, and unidentified, forces pushing towards 
convergence. The overall result was a very slight amount of convergence. 
When we divide the years 1952-65 into sub-periods, we replicate the same basic results 
for the first sub-period, 1952-57, but we fmd no tendencies towards convergence nor anti-
agricultural bias during 1957-65. The economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), 
the natural disasters of 1959-61, and the recovery under Liu Shaoqi (1962-65), created huge 
shocks to regional income but with little net effect on convergence. This is shown in evident in 
the third regression in Table 4, where neither the agricultural share nor initial income enter 
significantly. 
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(b) The Cultural Revolution, 1965-19783• 
In the previous section we found clear evidence for unconditional divergence during the 
Cultural Revolution, as shown by a rising standard deviation in Figure 2, and by the positive 
coefficient on initial income in the regression of Table 3. Let us consider the major factors that 
might lie behind these results. 
The Cultural Revolution was, of course, a seismic upheaval in social, political, and 
economic dimensions. In the economic domain we can mention five crucial components: 
(1) central planning was thoroughly disrupted, as a result of Mao Zedong's purge of the 
central government bureaucracy; 
(2) regions were forced into near autarky; 
(3) agricultural production was politicized in the extreme, with economic incentives 
nearly fully replaced by bureaucratic controls; 
(4) agricultural production was disrupted as provinces were forced to pursue self-
sufficiency in grain production; 
(5) heavy industrialization in the North East (Shanghai, Liaoning, and Tianjin) was 
continued. 
In Figure 3, we plot the growth of each province between 1965 and 1978 against 1965 per 
capita GDP. One can see that the three industrial regions (Shanghai, Liaoning, and Tianjin) 
contribute to the overall trend towards divergence: the industrial regions are relatively rich and 
grow relatively rapidly. The agricultural regions stagnate. In Table 5 we show that once the 
3 Cultural revolution took place between 1966-1976. Here the period division is for the sake 
of the paper. 
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agricultural share of the province is added to the regression of growth on initial income, the 
positive coefficient on initial income disappears. Hence, the cause of divergence is the anti-
agricultural bias of the Cultural Revolution. When we separate the period into two sub-periods, 
we see from the regression results that the anti-agricultural bias was most severe in the early 
phase, 1965-70. 
(c) Market reforms, 1978-1993. 
We have seen that during the most recent period there has been a trend of real income 
convergence among the provinces, though this convergence process may have slowed or reversed 
in the 1990s. In this section we examine convergence during the post-1978 reform period. 
There are five critical elements of China's market reforms after 1978: 
(a) the shift of agricultural production from the commune system to the household 
responsibility system; 
(b) the freedom of townships and villages to establish industrial enterprises outside of the 
central plan; 
(c) the gradual opening of the Chinese economy, particularly after the mid-1980s, both 
for trade and for foreign investment; 
(d) the increased migration of workers from rural areas to urban and coastal areas. 
(e) gradual reduction of centralized controls on prices, inputs and outputs, and the rising 
share of production outside of the state enterprise sector. 
It is important to understand the timing and significance of the various aspects of China's 
reforms. The first significant reforms were in the rural areas. Starting in 1979, and concluding 
by 1985, the commune system was completely dismantled, so that peasant households were once 
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again able to operate on their own plot of land. The households were responsible for delivering a 
fixed quota of crops to the government, and were able to sell any production surplus above that 
quota in the free market. The household plot was leased from the government, up to 15 years. 
Peasants were allowed to choose crops to plant, and to do activities other than traditional 
agriculture. Equally important, rural villages and townships were given the right to start small-
scale industrial, construction, commercial enterprises outside of the central plan. These township 
and village enterprises (TVEs) absorbed excess labor from agriculture. Thus, the TVEs were 
designed in part to absorb labor that would otherwise move to urban areas in search of work. 
This liberalization had two main effects. The first was a one-time spurt in agricultural 
productivity, mainly between 1978 and 1985, as agricultural production rebounded after the 
disasters of the commune system. After 1985, the pace of agricultural productivity improvement 
slowed markedly, as if the one-shot gains to liberalization had been reaped. The second main 
effect was the astounding growth of the TVEs, which continues to fuel rural growth until now. 
Thus, the liberalization of non-agricultural, non-state production has had a persistent effect on 
raising the growth rates of formerly agricultural areas. 
The second main reform was the gradual opening of the Chinese economy. Starting in 
the late 1970s, the currency was devalued and enterprises were given more freedom to engage in 
international trade, especially exporting. Starting in 1980, China established 4 Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in two provinces, Guangdong and Fujian. In the SEZs local governments had 
considerable latitude to grant special privileges to exporting firms such as the right to import 
their intermediate inputs without duty, as well as the right to retain some or all of the resulting 
foreign exchange earnings. Foreign investment was also encouraged. Later, in 1984-1985, 14 
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coastal cities in a further 8 provinces were granted similar rights to encourage trade and foreign 
investment. Import duties were cut, the exchange rate was further devalued with an aim to 
achieving convertibility on the current account, and the freedom of foreign investment was 
extended, though many restrictions remained as a part of the government's industrial promotion 
strategy. 
Across the entire reform period 1978-1993, we would expect the following to be true. 
First, rural areas should exhibit faster growth throughout the reform period. Second, the coastal 
regions should experience rapid growth as a result of the liberalization of international trade and 
investment flows. This should be especially evident after 1985, by which time 10 provinces had 
significant open coastal cities or special economic zones, and trade and foreign investment began 
to flow into China at significant rates. 
To test these ideas, we add two variables to the standard convergence regressions: the 
initial share of provincial GDP in agriculture at the start of the period (1978), and a dummy 
variable coded to take the value 1 if the province contains open coastal cities, and the value of 0 
otherwise. Regressions for the period 1978-93 are reported in Table 6A. We see that indeed, 
agricultural regions and coastal regions tended to grow more rapidly than the others. Once we 
control for agricultural and coastal regions, however, there is no additional evidence for 
convergence: the coefficient on initial income is slightly negative but far from statistical 
significance. 
When we divide the period into sub-periods as shown in Table 6B, we see that the coastal 
effect operates strongly only after 1985, and especially strongly after 1990. According to the 
regression results, being a coastal province is associated with 0.8 percentage points faster annual 
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growth during 1978-85; 3.2 percentage points during 1985-93; and fully 7.4 percentage points 
during 1990-93. The regressions also indicate that provinces with a high initial share of GDP in 
agriculture also grew faster in all sub-periods. It is probably more accurate to describe this as a 
rural effect rather than an agricultural effect, since much of the growth is probably due to the 
relatively fast growth of light industry, construction and services in the form of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) in agricultural provinces. Since TVEs have been one of the main 
sources of Chinese growth during the whole period, the agricultural regions have probably 
benefitted disproportionately in growth rates from THE development. 
Strikingly, once we control for the structural variables, there is no evidence for 
conditional convergence. The coefficient on initial income is always small and statistically 
insignificant. There were, apparently, no further systematic tendencies for poorer provinces to 
grow more rapidly than richer provinces after we take into account the rural reforms and the 
opening of the coastal areas. 
So far, our rural and coastal effects enter as separate effects; but there are reasons to think 
that open provinces with large rural areas should have grown faster than open provinces with 
smaller rural areas. First, the main source of surplus labor to be employed in growing industries 
was in rural areas. Second, although there has been considerable migration to urban areas, 
residence restrictions mean that migration from rural areas is still quite costly. Third, 
transportation costs mean that foreign investors prefer to invest in and trade with rural areas close 
to the coastal cities. Together, these three reasons lead us to expect an interaction between the 
coastal and rural effects. 
We examine this in column 4 table 6B by adding a coastal-agricultural interaction term to 
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the basic regressions. As we found before, during the flrst phase of refonn, 1978-1985, little else 
is signiflcant besides the agricultural share variable. Therefore, conyera;ence occurred durina; the 
flrst phase of reform because rural areas started out below averaie in per-capita income and then 
benefltted disproportionately from the reforms and thus "rew faster. During the second phase of 
the refonn that also included trade liberalization, we see an additional effect. In the fourth 
column of table 6B we see that the coastal dummy variable is not signiflcant but that the 
interaction tenn with the agricultural share variable is signiflcant. The agricultural share variable 
is still signiflcant. Therefore, conver"ence occurred durin" the second phase of reform because 
poorer rural areas continued to "row fast. but also because rura.l areas near open coastal cities 
"rew especially fast. Thus the opening promoted convergence, but it did so by raising incomes 
of rural areas adjacent to open coastal cities. 
We have seen that the overall effect of rapid agriCUltural and coastal growth was a 
narrowing of the dispersion of log incomes, and the regression evidence suggests that 
convergence was especially fast within the coastal regions. Now we examine the timing of the 
convergence across the 1978-1993 period more closely and divide China into coastal and interior 
regions. It turns out that almost all of the narrowing is due to a narrowing of income inequality 
among the coastal provinces, rather than a narrowing between the coasts and the interior 
provinces, or a narrowing of income inequalities among the interior provinces. This is evident in 
the variance decomposition shown in Table 7, where the overall variance of log incomes is 
decomposed into three components: within coast, within interior, and between coast and interior. 
We see a sharp narrowing of income inequalities among the coastal provinces, mainly as the 
agricultural South catches up with the industrial North. We see a slight narrowing among the 
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interior provinces, but that narrowing basically ends by 1985. Finally, we see a relatively 
constant variance between the coast and interior between 1978 and 1990, but then a dramatic 
widening after 1990. We now turn to the implications of this widening inequality between the 
coastal provinces and the interior. 
5. On a path of divergence in the 19905? 
Even though China evidenced regional income convergence after the onset of market 
reforms in 1978, the trend has seemingly reversed itself in the last few years. Starting in the early 
1990s, the standard deviation of log of per capita real GDP has increased. The rapid growth of 
the coastal regions is now widening the inequality between the relatively rich coastal provinces 
and relatively poor interior regions. 
Until the 1990s, the rapid growth of the coastal provinces did not contribute to an overall 
divergence of regional incomes. During the 1980s, the fastest growing coastal provinces were in 
the South, which started the period with below-averaae levels of per capita income. Two things 
changed in the 1990s. First, the relatively rich coastal provinces in the North, especially 
Shanghai, began to grow more rapidly. Second, by the 1990s, the fast-growing Southern 
provinces were no longer below average in income levels. Their continued rapid growth 
therefore began to contribute to overall divergence in the 1990s, rather than to convergence, as in 
the 1980s. 
These patterns can be seen clearly in Figure 4, where we divide the provinces into three 
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regions: North coastal, South Coastal, and Interior.4 Clearly the North coastal provinces 
(including the industrial provinces of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Liaoning) are the richest. The 
South coastal regions (including Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang) are next, followed by the Interior 
provinces. Figure 4 graphs the log of per capita income over the post reform period by the above 
three regions where per capita GDP is calculated by summing the total GDP within each region 
and divided by total population of the region. As we can see South Coastal provinces have faster 
growth throughout the period. Since they started out with below-average per capita income, their 
rapid growth initially reduced the overall dispersion of regional income. In the 1 990s, the North 
coastal regions accelerated, and the South coastal regions were far above the national average in 
per capita GDP. 
What will happen to the overall dispersion of Chinese regional income if the growth 
trends of recent years are maintained until the year 2000? To find out, we extrapolate recent 
growth rates forward from 1993 to 2000, and measure the standard deviation of log incomes as 
of the year 2000. The results are shown in Table 8. To make the extrapolations, we use four 
simple models: 
(1) simple extrapolation, using 1990-93 growth rates of 
each province; 
4 The classifications are as follows. North coastal: Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Hebei, Liaoning; South coastal: Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan (not in our 
sample); Interior: Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Beijing, 
Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Tibet (not in our sample), 
Xinjiang. 
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(2) simple extrapolation, using 1985-93 growth rates of 
each province; 
(3) regression of growth rate on initial income, coastal dummy variable, and agricultural 
share ofGDP, estimated for 1990-93; 
(4) same regression as in (3), estimated for 1985-93. 
When we project growth on the basis of the most recent years (1990-93), as in models (1) 
and (3), we project the largest increase in dispersion. This is because the coastal regions have 
been growing especially fast in the 1990s. When we project on the basis of 1985-93, as in 
models (2) and (4), the increase in dispersion is still large, but not as dramatic. The range of 
projected income dispersion is a value of a between 0.56 and 0.86, compared with a = 0.525 in 
1993. If the coastal regions continue to outpace the interior as they have done during 1990-93, 
then the overall amount of regional income dispersion will revert to levels of 1978, before the 
start of market refonns. It appears to us likely, however, the regional income inequality will 
widen rather than narrow in the years ahead. 
There are forces at work that could conceivably strengthen the trends towards 
convergence. As market forces become more important within China, the migration of factors 
across regions will also become important. Labor will migrate from the interior to the coasts, 
and capital will migrate from the coasts to the interior. In recent years, labor migration seems to 
be of increasing importance. It is now estimated that some 100-150 million people have 
infonnally migrated to jobs in urban and especially coastal areas. Most of this "floating 
population" is unregistered. For this reason, we may even be overestimating the amount of 
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divergence in income in recent years, by underestimating the population of the coastal regions 
and overestimating the population of the interior regions. Even less is known about interregional 
capital flows than is known about interregional labor flows. Anecdotal evidence suggests, 
however, that capital, like labor, has flowed from the interior to the coasts. In this case, capital 
has contributed to the forces of divergence, at least until now. 
6. Conclusions. 
We have found that real income convergence of Chinese provinces has been a relatively 
recent phenomena, emerging strongly only since the reform period began in 1978. For earlier 
periods, the evidence is not nearly as strong. During the initial phase of central planning, 1952-
1965, there is some evidence for convergence, but it is weak and sensitive to the time period 
being analyzed. During the cultural revolution, 1965-1978, there is strong evidence of 
divergence rather than convergence. 
We find that regional convergence is strongly associated with the extent ofmarketization 
and openness. Our strongest evidence for convergence is during the reform period. We find that 
convergence is associated with rural reforms, and is especially strong within the coastal regions 
where there has been liberalization of international trade and investment flows. 
Our explanation for this is that many of the channels of convergence, such as labor 
migration, capital flows and technological diffusion, were simply cut off under central planning. 
While it may be possible through bureaucratic allocation of resources to promote regional 
income equality, the evidence is that Chinese central planning had, ifanything, the opposite 
effect. 
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Since 1990 however, regional incomes have begun to diverge. Our evidence is that this is 
entirely explained by an increase in the variance between the coastal provinces and the interior 
provinces, rather than from an increase in the variance within either the coast or the interior. 
Since being a coastal province is a geographic advantage that will persist, this tendency for 
divergence will also probably continue. Therefore, given current policies, it seems that China is 
now on a dual track, with a prosperous and fast growing coastal region and a poor interior 
growing at a lower rate. 
The view put forward in the Fifth Section of the 14th Plenary ofCCPC, namely that 
refonns have exacerbated regional inequalities, is a misleading summary of Chinese regional 
development. Our statistics show that China's regional disparities actually narrowed between 
1978 and 1990. And even after 1990, inequalities decreased within the subset of coastal 
provinces, even as these coastal provinces widened their lead vis-a-vis the interior. There are no 
doubt many reasons for the diverging growth between the coastal regions and the interior, 
including: the natural advantages for international trade; the special economic privileges given to 
these regions, in tax policy and trade policy; and in recent years, the policy makers focus on 
Shanghai, which has thereby enjoyed very rapid growth. The Chinese Government has recently 
called for a policy ofleveling the playing field between the coasts and the interior, by scrapping 
some of the earlier privileges enjoyed by the coastal provinces. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to predict whether such policies will in fact slow the divergence between the coasts and the 
hinterland, and if so, whether by restraining the growth of the coastal provinces, spurring the 
growth of the interior, or a combination of both. 
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APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
This appendix describes data sources, methods in generating the data, and explains 
variables used. 
Sources of Data 
Our data cover forty two year period (1952-1993) and 28 provinces in China. The two 
exclusions are Hainan, newly established province and Tibet which does not have data until 
1987. All the data are compiled from Chinese official statistics pUblications. They are A) China 
Statistics Yearbook 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; B) various volumes of28 provincial statistics 
yearbooks; C) China's Historical Statistics 1949-1989; D) China Price Statistics Yearbook 1988-
1992. 
Because of the length of period covered and the number of variables involved, no single 
source is complete for the data we require. To make things more difficult is that each data source 
has its own drawbacks. For instance, Source A provides data for all provinces, but with fewer 
years and fewer decimal points, and data are not updated. Source B usually provides more 
detailed and longer time span data, but could differ from province to province in terms of years 
listed, or else, so direct comparison across provinces cannot be realized. Source C is a good 
complementary to Sources A and B, but not a substitute. It is aimed to build up a historical data 
by province such that data on each province contain the same variables and calculated in the 
same fashion. However, data in Source C tend to not be accurate for years in the late 1980s. 
Source D again provides a complementary to Source B for provincial retail price index. 
Approaches in Generatinll the Data 
Because of the nature of our data sources, we set up the following criteria to generate a 
consistent data base for the study. 1) Use the most possible recent data; 2) For years between 
1952 and 1989, use data from China's Historical Statistics 1949-1989 as much as possible and 
confirmed with other sources for data in the late 1980s; 3) Use provincial data as much as 
possible and confirmed with other sources; 4) Use data with more decimal points; 5) Whenever 
possible, enter all the data from sectors and sum them up to generate the total, and compare this 
total with the figure from the source. If the summed total differs from the printed total, then 
check other sources. In this way, we corrected many printing, rounding off errors, calculation 
errors from the origin. We believe that this compiled data are more reliable than data from any 
single source listed above. 
Definition and Explanation of Releyant Data 
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GDP 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product are defined in the same way 
as in the west. However, for most provinces we can fmd only GDP or GNP in China's statistics. 
And if both are provided, there the same for almost the entire period covered. In the rare 
circumstances in which GDP and GNP differ, the difference is very, very small, and will not 
affect statistics analysis results by misusing one for another, at least until 1993. Therefore, in 
cases where GDP is not available, its GNP is used instead. For years between 1952 and 1977 
there are only 15 provinces with GDP data, whereas after 1978 most provinces have GDP data. 
China's GDP is classified into three broad sectors: primary sector, secondary sector, and 
tertiary sector. Primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fishing and water 
supply. Secondary sector comprises of industry and construction. Tertiary sector includes 
mining, geographic survey and prospecting, transportation, commerce, public food and drinking 
services, material supply and purchases, material stocking, public utilities, science and research, 
education, governments and social organizations, culture, sports, social welfare, etc. We use 
primary sector share of GDP to measure the change in economic structure and its effect on 
growth. Note in the text, primary sector is loosely referred as agriculture sector. 
Population 
Total population refers to the total number of human beings at the end of a certain year in 
the region concerned. We use total population in combination ofGDP and deflated by provincial 
retail price index to generate per capita real GDP by province. 
Price Indexes 
1) Provincial retail price index: this is compiled by each province independently. We cannot 
find explanations on the number of products and the way how it is compiled, and we do not 
know if each province compiles it in the same manner. Data on provincial retail price index is 
available for years starting 1952 for about three quarters of the provinces for selected years. For 
years after 1978, the data are available for nine tenths of the provinces. 
2) Retail price index by province compiled by China's Statistics Bureau: it is compiled by using 
the same product list to compile such an index. The problem is that the data is available only 
after 1978 and it is available only in China Statistics Yearbook. As we mentioned that China 
Statistics Yearbook does not update the data for previous publications, so data may not be as 
accurate. Indeed when we compare it with provincial retail price index we found it reports lower 
retail prices for some of the provinces in years between 1978 and 1985. But the difference is only 
for a few provinces and our results would not change because of using either source. 
3) In our analysis, we use provincial retail price index for years between 1952 and 1978, and 
retail price index compiled by China Statistics Bureau for years 1978 and 1993. 
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Table 2: Basic Statistics. 1978. 
GDPPer 
Capita at 
Population 1952 prices Agriculture Coastal 
Name ( 10,000) (yuan) Share ofGDP Dummy 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing 849.70 1093.28 0.05 0 
Tianjin 724.00 985.39 0.06 1 
Hebei 5057.00 367.88 0.29 1 
Shanxi 2423.60 308.46 0.21 0 
Inner Mongolia 1823.00 260.16 0.34 0 
Liaoning 3394.00 535.09 0.15 1 
Jilin 2149.30 286.01 0.29 0 
Heilongjiang 3129.60 430.84 0.24 0 
Shanghai 1098.28 2324.51 0.04 1 
Jiangsu 5834.00 372.37 0.28 1 
Zhejiang 3751.00 299.57 0.38 1 
Anhui 4713.00 201.22 0.48 0 
Fujian 2452.80 235.75 0.36 1 
Jiangxi 3183.00 225.20 0.42 0 
Shandong 7160.00 297.93 0.33 1 
Henan 7067.00 189.99 0.40 0 
Hubei 4574.91 268.08 0.40 0 
Hunan 5165.91 212.09 0.41 0 
Guangdong 5064.15 330.99 0.30 1 
Guangxi 3402.00 163.99 0.41 1 
Hainan 528.00 
Sichuan 9708.00 169.92 0.39 0 
Guizhou 2686.00 133.22 0.42 0 
Yunnan 3091.00 209.28 0.43 0 
Tibet 179.00 
Shaanxi 2780.00 253.98 0.30 0 
Gansu 1870.00 304.71 0.20 0 
Qinghai 365.00 550.92 0.24 0 
Ningxia 356.00 284.56 0.18 0 
Xinjiang 1233.00 335.47 0.36 0 
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Table 3; Basic Conyen~ence Reilressions. 
1952-65 1965-78 1978-93 
Constant 0.008 0.103 -0.004 
(0.302) (6.137) (0.237) 
Log of Initial -0.006 0.016 -0.017 
Per Capita Real GDP (-1.126) (3.735) (-3.320) 
Observations 15 15 28 
R-squared 0.088 0.518 0.298 
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Table 4: 1952-1965 Re2ressjoos 
De.pendeut variable: Annual growth rate ofreal per capita GDP. 
Log Initial Initial Adj. 
Per Capita Agriculture Coostant R-squared Observatioos 
Real GDP GDP Share 
52-65 -0.029 -0.079 -0.054 0.159 15 
(-2.103) (-1.779) (-1.295) 
52-57 -0.062 -0.180 -0.114 0.119 15 
(-1.973) (-1.809) (-1.208) 
57-65 -0.001 0.012 0.007 -0.053 15 
(-0.056) (0.317) (0.227) 
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Table 5: 1965-1977 Re2ressions, 














Agriculture Constant R-squared Observations 
GDP Share 
-0,078 0,055 0,589 15 
(-2.105) (2,017) 
-0,187 0,006 0.491 15 
(-2.467) (0,102) 
0,007 0,087 0,127 15 
(0.113) (2,506) 
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Table 6A: 1978-1993 Re~ressions. 
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of real per capita GDP 
f~riQd Log Initial Initial 
Per Capita Agriculture Coast Adj. 
Real GDP GDP Share R-squared Observations 
78-93 -0.017 0.271 28 
(-3.320) 
-0.001 0.097 0.331 28 
(-0.086) (1.828) 
-0.009 0.080 0.021 0.576 28 
(-1.105) (1.883) (3.933) 
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Table 6B: 1978-1993 Re~ressions. 
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of real per capita GDP. 
Observations: 28 
Coast 
Log Initial Initial Interacted with 
Per Capita Agriculture Coast Agriculture Adj. 
Period Real GDP GDP Share GDP Share R-squared 
78-85 -0.023 0.271 
(-3.788) 
-0.003 0.116 0.394 
(-0.246) (1.931) 
-0.006 0.110 0.008 0.397 
(-0.507) (1.818) (1.054) 
-0.002 0.107 -0.006 0.047 0.384 
(-0.170) (1.745) (-0.273) (0.697) 
85-93 -0.010 0.029 
(-1.348) 
0.017 0.156 0.169 
(1.243) (2.314) 
0.002 0.130 0.032 0.613 
(0.185) (2.820) (5.448) 
0.007 0.974 -0.001 0.108 0.674 
(0.744) (2.179) (-0.070) (2.338) 
90-93 0.005 -0.034 
(0.334) 
0.040 0.190 -0.003 
(1.319) (1.343) 
0.012 0.206 0.074 0.683 
(0.714) (2.584) (7.423) 
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition: COast and Interior 
Variance Variance Variance 
Total within the within the between the 
year Variance Coast Interior Coast & Interior 
78 0.3819 0.5837 0.2088 0.0514 
82 0.3136 0.4290 0.1806 0.0539 
83 0.3147 0.4330 0.1945 0.0452 
84 0.3136 0.4277 0.1901 0.0486 
85 0.2894 0.3982 0.1681 0.0482 
86 0.2798 0.3733 0.1648 0.0492 
87 0.2704 0.3481 0.1608 0.0509 
88 0.2663 0.3306 0.1648 0.0504 
89 0.2621 0.3136 0.1656 0.0517 
90 0.2490 0.2927 0.1608 0.0487 
91 0.2550 0.2663 0.1689 0.0589 
92 0.2663 0.2470 0.1706 0.0758 
93 0.2756 0.2372 0.1552 0.0980 
~ The variance decomposition is from the formula: 
Var(X) = a* Var(Xl) + b* Var(X2) + c* (Mean(Xl) - Mean(X2»2 
Where Xl refers to the coastal regions and X2 refers to the interior. The last three columns in 
the table correspond to Var(X1), Var(X2), and c* (Mean(Xl) - Mean(X2»2. The constants a, b, 
and c, are weights that depend on the number of provinces in each of the two regions. 
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Table 8: Projections ofReiional Income Dispersion in the Year 2000 
~ 
1993 
Projections for 2000 
1) based on actual 90-93 growth rates 
2) based on actual 85-93 growth rates 
3) based on regression of growth rates 
on initial income, coastal dummy, 
and agricultural share ofODP, 
estimated for 90-93 
4) based on regression of growth rates 
on initial income, coastal dummy, 
and agricultural share ofODP, 
estimated for 85-93 
Standard Deyiation 




















HL HEILONGJiANG B. AUTONOMOUS REGION 
HEN HEIIAN 
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Figure 1: Administrative Division of China 
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Figure 3: Growth Rates Versus Initial Income, 1965-1978 
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